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Auditors’ Liability to Investors for Clients’ Inadequate Disclosure 
or 
The Auditor as Police Dog
Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA 
University of Washington 
Seattle, Washington
(Part 2)
GUEST WRITER: This column was written by 
Margaret R. Liles, a staff auditor with the 
Seattle office of Price Waterhouse & Co.
The article is in two parts; the first part 
appeared in the April 1976 issue.
Since Part I of this article was written, the 
U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision 
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder1 reversing the 
decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals discussed in Part I. The court 
ruled that a private cause of action for 
damages will not lie against an accountant 
under Rule 10b-5 in the absence of allega­
tion and proof of "scienter," i.e., intent to 
deceive, manipulate or defraud on the 
part of the accountant. The Court noted 
that the language of section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 connoted 
intentional or willful conduct designed to 
deceive or defraud investors, and that an 
accountant cannot be liable for negligent 
conduct alone. The Court expressly re­
served decision, however, as to whether 
or not in some circumstances reckless 
behavior would be sufficient for liability, 
so that actual knowledge may not be the 
test as long as the defendant recklessly 
ignores what is under his or her nose.
Thus, since Part I of this article was 
written, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
Hochfelder decision may have decreed that 
the accountant-police dog's nose need not 
be that of a bloodhound, thereby substan­
tially reducing the importance of the “sniff 
function" as outlined in Part I. On the 
other hand, although significant, one de­
cision does not make the law, and it will 
undoubtedly be years before a body of law 
defining the limits and implications of the 
Hochfelder decision will be developed. In 
any event, the "bark" and "bite" 
functions discussed below depend on ac­
tual knowledge, or something akin to it, so 
that the "scienter" requirement of the 
Hochfelder decision will probably be met in 
the circumstances discussed under these 
captions.
The Bark Function — 
Accountant's Liability for 
Inadequate or Improper 
Presentation
Even when an auditing firm has per­
formed an unusually extensive and dili­
gent audit of a client's financial transac­
tions and has issued a qualified opinion 
despite strong client objections, it appears 
that the accountant may still be liable to 
investors for their losses for failure to 
make adequate disclosure about the 
client's financial condition and the facts 
which prompted the qualified opinion in 
its report on the audited financial state­
ments. In the case of Herzfeld v. Laventhol, 
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath2 the Court 
held the auditors liable to investors under 
Rule 10b-5 for issuing a misleading report 
on the audited financial statements of its 
client. The holding of the Court is disturb­
ing because the decision extends what 
constitutes adequate disclosure beyond 
the reporting standards required by gen­
erally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), because of the dicta of the Court 
to the effect that compliance with GAAP 
does not necessarily assure adequate dis­
closure, and because of the reasons the 
Court used to justify its holding the au­
ditors liable.
In the Herzfeld case the accounting firm 
of Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor­
wath (Laventhol) had been retained by the 
Firestone Group, Ltd., (FGL), a California 
real estate syndicate, to perform an audit 
pursuant to a private placement of $7.5 
million of securities by FGL. The audited 
financial statements and Laventhol's qual­
ified opinion on the financial statements 
were found misleading because of the 
accounting treatment accorded to the pur­
chase and sale of certain nursing home 
properties (the Monterey transaction), the 
largest single transaction of FGL. Several 
members of the auditing firm went to 
extraordinary lengths to review the 
Monterey transaction, even obtaining an 
outside legal opinion on the contracts. 
Because they established the facts that the 
down payments were small, that the pur­
chaser had a net worth of only $100,000, 
that no title search or title insurance had 
been obtained, and that the transaction 
was doubtful, they required — despite 
objections by both the client and the 
underwriter — that the FGL defer most of 
the profit ($1.65 million) and allowed the 
client to take into income only the actual 
cash received and the amount promised as 
liquidated damages if the buyer defaulted 
($235,000). Laventhol further issued only 
a qualified opinion “subject to the collecti­
bility of the balance receivable on the 
contract of sale," and provided a detailed 
description of the contracts in the foot­
notes to the financial statements. It later 
turned out that the properties were never 
acquired or sold by FGL and the company 
recognized a substantial loss instead of a 
profit.
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The Court held Laventhol liable because 
it had included the Monterey transaction 
in sales and income and had not fully 
revealed to investors its reservations and 
doubts concerning consummation of the 
transaction and the facts upon which its 
reservations were based.3 In other words, 
Laventhol was faulted for not barking long 
and loud enough to warn the unwary 
investor when Laventhol came upon sus­
picious circumstances. The Court focused 
on what would have constituted adequate 
disclosure under the circumstances and 
specifically stated that the qualification 
language in the auditor's opinion was 
inadequate. The court said:
"Our inquiry is not focused on 
whether Laventhol's report satisfies 
esoteric accounting norms, com­
prehensible only to the initiate, but 
whether the report fairly presents the 
true financial position of Firestone ... to 
the untutored eye of an ordinary inves­
tor."4 [Emphasis supplied].
The Court held further that Laventhol had 
an affirmative duty of disclosure because it 
knew its report was being made exclu­
sively for the private placement and be­
cause it knew investors were relying on 
Laventhol "as a public accounting firm, to 
reveal the truth about FGL's financial con­
dition."5 [Emphasis supplied]. Such lan­
guage appears to make the auditor the 
insurer of a client's financial statements. 
Moreover, the auditor's reporting is to be 
judged from the perspective of hindsight 
by the standard of whether adequate dis­
closure was made of all facts investors 
needed to interpret the financial state­
ments accurately rather than whether pro­
fessional standards were met.6 The fun­
damental objection of the Court appears to 
be that Laventhol allowed FGL to include 
any of the proceeds from the Monterey 
transaction in current income, given that 
they had substantial doubts about the 
enforceability of the contract and did not 
require as a condition to the audit a written 
opinion by an attorney experienced in real 
estate transactions.
In sum the court, despite all its words 
about inadequate disclosure, appears to 
fault Laventhol principally for insufficient 
investigation and poor judgment, and 
perhaps for yielding to client pressure to 
bend the rules in its favor. To expose 
auditors to liability to investors for what 
from the benefit of hindsight turns out to 
be poor judgment, even though made in 
accordance with standards of the account­
ing profession, is an unprecedented ex­
tension of auditor's liability. Perhaps in 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in 
the Hochfelder case, the district court in the 
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Herzfeld case went too far. However, it is 
evident that, on the authority of the 
Herzfeld case at least, in the event a com­
pany's financial transactions turn sour 
and investors suffer losses and are unable 
to recoup them from the company, the 
courts would scrutinize the auditing and 
reporting practices followed by the com­
pany's auditor in an attempt to impose 
liability on the auditor. In effect, to protect 
an auditor from civil liability, the financial 
statements would have to be written like a 
prospectus. It is difficult to believe that 
decision is really a fair statement of the law 
and would have been upheld on appeal; 
but the case was not appealed and thus 
allowed to stand and cannot be ignored by 
accountants although its requirements are 
extreme.
In any event, it is evident under the 
authority of the Herzfeld case that the 
auditor must not only bark loudly but he 
must also bark clearly when confronted 
with potential audit dangers, and the 
traditional qualification language used in 
auditors' opinions may not constitute a 
clear enough bark.
The Bite Function — 
Accountant's Liability for 
Failure to Alert Authorities
The position of the SEC in its complaint 
against National Student Marketing Cor­
poration (NSMC)7 would extend an au­
ditor's liability for aiding and abetting a 
Rule 10b-5 violation to failure to notify 
shareholders or the SEC in the event that 
unaudited interim financial statements are 
materially misleading. The SEC contends 
that Peat, Marwick & Mitchell (PMM), 
who, pursuant to a merger between 
NSMC and Interstate National Corpora­
tion (Interstate), issued a comfort letter 
requiring material adjustments on the 
interim statements, had a duty to with­
draw from the engagement and to notify 
the Commission or the NSMC and In­
terstate shareholders when NSMC failed 
to revise its interim statements in accor­
dance with the comfort letter. Even 
though the Interstate representatives and 
counsel were aware of the deficiencies in 
the comfort letter and decided to proceed 
with the closing of the merger nonethe­
less, the SEC position is that PMM should 
have, in order to avoid personal liability, 
withdrawn from the engagement and in­
formed on the client to agents of the 
government. Thus, the SEC expects au­
ditors to sink their fangs into the hand that 
feeds them if their client turns out to be the 
thief.
If the SEC's position in this pending 
action is upheld, and accountants are 
required to perform an enforcement func­
tion in connection with unaudited finan­
cial statements which they believe to be 
materially misleading, they will be ex­
posed to greater responsibilities, duties, 
and thus liabilities, than proscribed by the 
standards of the profession, which recog­
nizes such a duty only in connection with 
audited financial statements.8
Although the final outcome in the Na­
tional Student Marketing actions remains to 
be seen, there is some precedent for the 
SEC's position in an earlier Seventh Cir­
cuit holding in Brennan v. Midwestern 
United Life Insurance Company,9 which had 
certain similarities to the SEC complaint in 
National Student Marketing, although no 
accountant was involved. In that case the 
Court held that silence or inaction alone is 
not enough to incur liability for aiding and 
abetting a violation of the anti-fraud pro­
visions of the securities laws; but if some 
benefit is received directly or indirectly by 
the person who fails to disclose knowl­
edge of another's securities fraud upon 
the public to the proper regulatory au­
thorities, then such silence or inaction 
might constitute rendering substantial as­
sistance to the fraud of another and result 
in liability on an aider and abettor theory. 
(The Supreme Court in the Hochfelder case 
expressly declined to prescribe the criteria 
for aiding and abetting under Rule 10b-5.)
Although the Brennan case does not 
involve an accountant as an aider and 
abettor, the case has important implica­
tions for accountants for it established the 
conditions under which silence could con­
stitute aiding and abetting. One can easily 
imagine a situation in which by hindsight 
an accountant would be deemed to have 
known about a client's fraudulent activi­
ties but would be under no statutory duty 
to report such activities to the regulatory 
authorities. For example, a client could 
make a misleading press release having 
nothing to do with either audited or "as­
sociated with" financial statements. The 
fee received by the accountant probably 
would be viewed as a sufficient benefit to 
make him or her liable, for clearly if the 
accountant were to turn in the client to the 
authorities s/he would lose the client, 
future fees, and perhaps uncollected fees 
for previously rendered services if the 
regulatory authorities should thwart a 
pending financial transaction upon whose 
successful completion payment of such 
fee was dependent.
It is significant that the Brennan court 
did not purport to find a specific statutory 
duty to take action to prevent the fraud, 
but emphasized investor protection as the 
paramount consideration of the federal 
securities laws in general, and specifically 
of the Exchange Act.10 Since the primary 
wrongdoer was insolvent, as is often the 
case, the party found guilty of aiding and 
abetting the fraud is liable for the inves­
tor's losses. Accountants faced with civil 
liability and large damages as aiders and 
abettors should note that active assistance 
of another's fraud is not a necessary factor 
in such liability — silence or inaction can 
constitute substantial assistance. The risk 
of liability for failure to notify the SEC 
and/or the public of the misleading nature 
of previously issued financial statements 
with which an accountant is associated is 
substantial.
Shifting the Liability Burden — 
Indemnification, Insurance 
and the Investing Public
One approach accountants might take to 
meeting the increased standards for liabil­
ity would be to attempt to shift the burden 
contractually to the client by an agreement 
of indemnification. Unfortunately, under 
the doctrine of Globus v. Law Research 
Services, Inc.,11 an agreement for indem­
nification for violation of the anti-fraud 
provisions of the securities laws is void as 
against public policy. The reasoning be­
hind this doctrine is that liability is im­
posed under the securities laws as an 
incentive to greater diligence to sniff out 
and disclose violations of the law, and any 
indemnification by the defrauding person 
would substantially reduce this desirable 
incentive.
Although no cases on the subject exist, 
malpractice insurance covering liabilities 
under the securities laws would seem to 
stand on a different footing than indem­
nification. Insurance may reduce some­
what the incentive toward professional 
diligence; however, unlike indem­
nification, insurance provides an 
additional pool of funds which may be 
used to repay a defrauded investor, so that 
recovery on a contract of insurance does 
not result in taking funds from one of the 
investor's pockets (the client company in 
which the investor is a stockholder) and 
putting it into another.
Premium costs for accountant malprac­
tice insurance with securities laws cover­
age have increased substantially in recent 
years and will probably increase even 
more in the future. Further, inclusion of 
securities laws violations in policy cover­
age has become difficult for small account­
ing firms to obtain. Accountants' malprac­
tice insurance policies are generally 
worded to protect the insured only against 
claims or actions for "damage” and thus 
do not cover defense of criminal proceed­
ings, or similar actions in which "damage" 
recoveries are not sought. Also, because 
accountant malpractice insurance policies 
are designed to protect only against dam­
age claims, an insurance carrier is not 
obligated to consider possible damage to 
professional reputation or future business 
in weighing the desirability of an early 
settlement.12
Because the new standards will require 
public accountants to spend greater 
amounts of time and effort in their review, 
and because the increased costs of mal­
practice insurance will ultimately have to 
be shifted to the client, the average cost of 
accounting fees which businesses will 
bear in the future will certainly be signifi­
cantly higher than in the past. Thus, 
American businesses, and ultimately their 
public stockholders, will ultimately and 
indirectly bear the burden of the increased 
costs associated with the increased 
standards of professional performance 
imposed upon accountants under the re­
cent securities laws cases.
For smaller, riskier companies, the 
"marginal" companies with declining 
earnings, these increased costs may be a 
substantial burden and may increase the 
tendency for such companies to forego 
public accounting services whenever pos­
sible. These, however, are the very types 
of companies for which public accoun­
tants must exercise extended diligence 
under the new requirements and are 
probably the types of clients that need 
good accounting services.
Moreover, even the largest and most 
solvent companies cannot afford to have 
auditors employ all possible audit proce­
dures that might lead to the detection of 
collusive fraud by management. Hence, 
there is some doubt that public investors 
would be protected from many of the 
headline-making types of fraud, such as 
occurred in the Equity Funding scandal.
Conclusion
There is no question that in recent years 
massive frauds on the investing public 
have been uncovered. Some of them 
probably would not have progressed as far 
had greater diligence in uncovering and 
disclosing them been exercised by the 
public accountants involved. In retro­
spect, accountants probably should have 
been more active and diligent in identify­
ing the frauds and less motivated toward 
pleasing their clients. Whether or not 
applied standards of review are deemed to 
fall within or without generally accepted 
auditing standards and accounting prin­
ciples is irrelevant — clearly new 
standards of greater review are required of 
the accounting profession, whether by the 
profession itself, the administrative agen­
cies, or the courts.
Since the standards for liability and thus 
for investigation vary with the facts of 
each case, it is difficult to establish any 
fixed procedures for investigation and 
review that an accountant should under­
take in order to escape liability under the 
new standards. CPAs are exposed to in­
creased liability to investors for in­
adequate investigation, misapplication of 
accounting principles and inadequate or 
misleading disclosures which are mate­
rially misleading and operate to deceive 
investors. The evolving standard for a 
public accountant's liability to investors is 
increasingly demanding and at present 
vague. However, it is clear that the 
standards have increased and thus more 
review is needed and that, if a substantial 
fraud lies under an accountant's nose, s/he 
will be liable no matter how carefully the 
routine checks traditionally required have 
been performed. It is doubtful that the 
Supreme Court's decisions in the Hochfel­
der case has changed this as a practical 
matter. Shoddy performance or "rubber 
stamping" of a client's disclosures even if 
tolerable in the past will render public 
accountants vulnerable to Rule 10b-5 lia­
bility and will thus force the accounting 
profession to employ a higher level of care 
(Continued on IBC)
University of Massachusetts 
at Amherst 
is seeking faculty additions 
in accounting.
Preference will be given to persons holding 
the Ph.D. or D.B.A. degree or persons close 
to securing degree. Positions available in the 
financial, managerial, auditing and tax areas. 
Representatives will be available at the AAA 
Convention in Atlanta in August. The Univer­
sity is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Ac­
tion employer. Send resumes to:
Professor Anthony Krzystofik,
Chairman, Department of Accounting, 
School of Business Administration, 
University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Mass. 01002.
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Prior to making a career commitment to a 
university teaching position, a candidate 
may want to study the affirmative action 
plan of the particular university for the 
following elements:19
1. Statement that the university will 
follow nondiscriminatory policies.
2. Statement that the president or chief 
campus officer has responsibility for af­
firmative action.
3. Delegation of responsibility by the 
president to a top campus official for 
development and implementation of af­
firmative action policies.
4. Provision for a full-time affirmative 
action officer with functions carefully de­
veloped.
5. Provision for an affirmative action 
committee(s) with membership deter­
mined in consultation with affected 
groups on campus and with functions 
carefully developed.
6. Provision for dissemination of the 
affirmative action plan to all persons as­
sociated with the institution.
7. Presentation of data on employment 
of faculty, nonfaculty academic person­
nel, and nonacademic personnel related 
to:
a. Racial and sexual composition by 
department and rank for the most 
recent three or four years.
b. Pools of qualified persons by race 
and sex for each academic field.
c. Goals and timetables for appro­
priate campus units.
8. Statement of nondiscriminatory re­
cruitment and selection procedures with 
provision for maintaining records.
9. Provision for review of each ap­
pointment by appropriate administrators, 
including the top campus official having 
responsibility for affirmative action.
10. Provision for nondiscriminatory 
procedures in promotion.
11. Provision for salary analyses to de­
termine if inequities exist based on sex or 
race.
12. Provision for development of 
adequate grievance procedures.
Conclusion
Increasingly university personnel are rec­
ognizing that they are depriving them­
selves of a large reserve of potential 
scholars and teachers by not actively seek­
ing qualified women for faculty positions. 
The federal government is involved in 
enforcement of nondiscrimination and af­
firmative action in higher education 
through the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Execu­
tive Order No. 11246, Revised Order No. 
4, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 
1972, and other similar legislation. The 
time is "right" for increasing numbers of 
women to consider careers in accounting 
education.
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14Public Law 92-318, June 23, 1972.
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to assure fair presentation and adequate 
disclosure. Compliance with professional 
standards and customs will not necessar­
ily protect accountants if they do not meet 
the fair presentation standard or if it is 
determined that, because of their unique 
position of trust, they should have gone 
beyond the reporting standards of the 
profession in order to assure adequate 
disclosure.
Accountant may not escape these new 
responsibilities by attempting to shift 
them to client through indemnification, 
nor is reliance upon increased malpractice 
insurance wholly satisfactory. The only 
acceptable alternative is to face their new 
responsibilities directly and use their best 
efforts to do an independent and careful 
professional job with every effort to main­
tain their independence and integrity free 
from any improper influence by the client. 
This should not be viewed as attempting 
to teach an old dog new tricks but, rather, 
as practicing and perfecting tricks that 
have been with them since dog school. 
Only by careful discipline can our police 
dog be assured that it will not wind up in 
the pound.
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